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The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment came on regularly for hearing before
the Honorable James R. Taylor on April 4, 2001; Craig V. Wentz and Barton H. Kunz II
appearing for defendants, and Gordon Duval and Brian K. Haws appearing for plaintiffs. Upon
reviewing the pleadings, memoranda, and documents on file, and hearing the arguments of
counsel, the Court enters the following judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
58A(b):
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' first cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. The Court finds

that Utah Code Annotated § 17-27-1001(2) bars challenges to a county's land use decisions,
including temporary zoning regulations, thirty days after the decision was rendered, not the
ordinance's effective date. Accordingly, plaintiffs7 challenge to Wasatch County Ordinance 9701 is untimely. Furthermore, because Ordinance 97-01 had expired by July 1997, Ordinance 976 did not have the effect of extending it. Ordinance 97-6 has never been effective because it was
never signed nor published; therefore, plaintiffs' challenge to Ordinance 97-6 is moot.
Plaintiffs' challenge to Ordinance 97-13 is timely. However, the arguments plaintiffs
assert against Ordinance 97-13 fail. First, the Court finds that because some or all of the
development is located in an area with a long history of instability and land slippage, and that the
County had justified concern regarding slope stability and the suitability of the area for building,
especially the safety of septic systems, and had exhibited such concern for a substantial time, the
enactment was not arbitrary or capricious and responded to a legitimate governmental concern
for the public health and safety.
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Finally, no taking has occurred because the County had a compelling public interest to
determine whether the slope was stable and septic systems were safe in the area. Ordinance 9713 was thus a legitimate legislative response to a public welfare need. Utah Code Annotated §
17-27-404, the statute authorizing the adoption of temporary zoning regulations, is subject only
to the requirements of that section, and therefore regulations created under it do not first need to
be submitted to a planning commission. Additionally, the cost necessarily associated with
providing a private study showing the safety of an area for a building to avoid the effect of the
temporary zoning ordinance does not constitute a fee and is not contrary to Utah law. Plaintiffs'
cross motion for summary judgment on this cause of action is denied.
2.

Plaintiffs' second cause of action against the County Commissioners is

dismissed with prejudice. The Court finds that the actions of the County Commissioners were
legislative in nature and therefore subject to absolute immunity. The County Commissioners
have absolute immunity for their actions related to Ordinances 97-1, 97-13, and 97-11, regardless
of any alleged malice. Insofar as plaintiffs contend in this cause of action that Ordinances 97-1,
97-13, and Resolution 99-11 are unconstitutional because they violate the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, those claims are also dismissed with prejudice. See infra,ffl[5, 13.
With respect to defendants Phil Wright and Bob Mathis, their actions, if proven, were
nonlegislative in nature, and therefore, a cause of action might be sustained with proof of bad
faith and/or malice.
Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment on this cause of action is denied.
3.

Plaintiffs5 third cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. The moratoria

imposed by the County ordinances did not effect a physical taking. To the extent the temporary

3
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zoning regulations at issue deprive plaintiffs of all economic benefit of their property, plaintiffs'
actions fail because the County could have similarly regulated the property under a theory of
nuisance. The Court finds that the plaintiffs' own concerns about contaminated ground water,
slope stability, and seepage of effluent, coupled with State and private agency reports that also
expressed these concerns, confirm that the County enacted these ordinances out of a compelling
concern of a threat to public health and safety. Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment
on this cause of action is denied.
4.

Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, to the extent it asserts that prior zoning

regulations in the Canyon Meadows area estopped the County from imposing the
temporary zoning regulation, is dismissed with prejudice. The Court finds that the County
became reasonably concerned about the general suitability of the area for building and properly
acted under its police power to protect the public health and safety. The County acted under a
statute that authorized its conduct. The fact that prior regulations and/or approval existed or
were made merely reinforces the legitimacy of the conclusion that a temporary zoning regulation
was required until further study was complete. Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment
on this cause of action is denied.
Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, to the extent it seeks declaratory judgment
that the temporary zoning regulations are no longer in effect, is also dismissed with
prejudice. This issue is moot. The undisputed evidence in this case is that a number of building
permits have been issued to Canyon Meadows' residents since November 1998. The Court
therefore concludes that Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13 have expired and are no longer being
enforced. Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment on this point is denied.

4
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Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, to the extent it asserts that certain
representations made by Wasatch County officials estopped the County from denying
building permits to certain plaintiffs creates a genuine issue of fact. There is some evidence
that defendants Phil Wright and Bob Mathis made representations shortly before the first
moratorium that some individuals had property suitable for building and there would be no
problem in obtaining the necessary permits. The Court is unable, on the state of the record at this
time, to determine if the interests of justice would mandate application of the estoppel doctrine to
plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief under these facts and circumstances. The Court will reserve
a finding on this issue until it can hear all the evidence on an appropriate equitable remedy, given
the Court's conclusion that Ordinance 97-13 has expired and is no longer being enforced.
Accordingly, summary judgment on this point is denied. Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary
judgment on this point is also denied.
5.

Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. The Court finds

that the County's, plaintiffs' and others' concerns about slope stability and septic tank suitability
in this area constitute a rational basis for Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13, defeating plaintiffs' equal
protection and substantive due process claims.
Plaintiffs' equal protection claim does not implicate a fundamental right or affect a
suspect class. The court further finds that the classification at issue had a rational basis,
predicated on the undisputed concerns about slope and septic tank suitability expressed by
plaintiffs and representatives of State agencies. Plaintiffs' equal protection claim, therefore, fails
as a matter of law.

5
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Plaintiffs' substantive due process claims also require this Court to apply the rational
basis test. The Court has already held that there was a rational basis for the ordinances in
question. Accordingly, plaintiffs' substantive due process claims fail as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs' procedural due process claims also fail as a matter of law. Utah Code
Annotated § 17-27-404 permits the County's legislative body to adopt a temporary zoning
regulation without a public hearing and notice, provided the legislative body makes a finding of a
compelling, countervailing public interest. Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13 did not require a hearing
because they were adopted pursuant to section 404. Additionally, the Court finds that plaintiffs
had actual notice of and submitted evidence prior to the adoption of Ordinance 97-13.
Furthermore, Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13 contain specific findings as to the existence of a
compelling, countervailing public interest.
Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment on this cause of action is denied.
6.

Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action insofar as it applies to Ordinance 97-1 is

dismissed with prejudice. The Court finds that Ordinance 97-1 expired within the six months
mandated by Utah Code Annotated § 17-17-404. Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment
on this cause of action is denied.
Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action, insofar as it applies to Ordinance 97-13, creates a
genuine issue of fact. There is a question as to exactly when Ordinance 97-13 expired. The
Court will reserve a finding on this issue until it can hear all of the evidence on an appropriate
equitable remedy, if any, given the Court's conclusion that Ordinance 97-13 has expired and is
no longer being enforced. Accordingly, summary judgment on this point is denied. Plaintiffs'
cross motion for summary judgment on this cause of action is denied.

6
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7.

Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. The County

Commission made the findings required under Utah Code Annotated § 17-27-404 to support the
adoption of Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13. The Commission's findings, which are entitled to
deferential review, created a sufficient basis for the County to determine that a compelling,
countervailing public interest sufficient to support Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13 existed.
Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment on this cause of action is denied.
8. & 9. Plaintiffs' eighth and ninth causes of action are dismissed with prejudice.
Although the Court finds that Ordinance 97-13 was not effective until its publication in
November 1997, the plaintiffs failed to assert a legal theory to support their claim for equitable
relief for the County attorneys' alleged misstatement that the ordinance had become effective
upon its passage. (No applications for building permits were received between August 11, 1997,
and August 24, 1998).

Consequently, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the ordinance

was ever enforced against them during this time period. Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary
judgment on this cause of action is denied.
10.

Plaintiffs' tenth cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. The Court defers

to the legislative findings of the County Commissioners and finds that there was not only
reasonably debatable, but substantial evidence to support its adoption of Ordinance 97-13.
Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment on this cause of action is denied.
11.

Plaintiffs' eleventh cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. Declaratory

relief for the tort of trespass is unavailable under Utah law. Furthermore, the Court finds that
allowing the County and the County Health Department to monitor ground water levels in this
area where there is justifiable concern for slope stability and septic contamination is within the

7
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public interest and permitted under Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-8(2). Plaintiffs' cross motion
for summary judgment on this cause of action is denied.
12.

Plaintiffs' twelfth cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. Governmental

immunity has not been waived for the tort of interference with economic relations under Utah
Code Annotated § 63-30-10(2). Moreover, the Court finds that Ordinance 97-13 did not prohibit
the sale of property in the area at issue. It merely prohibited sales without a concurrent
disclosure by the seller of the existence of Ordinance 97-13. Plaintiffs' cross motion for
summary judgment on this cause of action is denied.
13.

Plaintiffs' thirteenth cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. The Court

finds as a matter of law that Resolution 99-11 does not infringe upon constitutional rights nor
violate State law. The County legislators merely assign control over who disseminates litigation
information to the department best able to do so. Moreover, plaintiffs have provided no factual
basis that would allow the Court to conclude that plaintiffs' rights have been deprived under this
resolution. Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment on this cause of action is denied.
14.

Insofar as plaintiffs' fourteenth cause of action appropriately seeks punitive

damages against the County Commissioners, it is dismissed with prejudice. There is no
separate cause of action for punitive damages. In any event, the County Commissioners enjoy
absolute immunity with respect to plaintiffs' § 1983 damage claims. No damages of any kind
may be assessed against those defendants.
Insofar as plaintiffs' fourteenth cause of action appropriately seeks punitive
damages against defendants Bob Mathis and Phil Wright under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, questions
of fact preclude summary judgment. The Court finds there is a question of fact as to whether

8

2168

punitive damages may be assessed against defendants Bob Mathis and Phil Wright, or whether
they are immune from such damages under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Accordingly,
defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied on this point. Plaintiffs' cross motion for
summary judgment on this cause of action is also denied.
15.

Therefore, the only issues that remain before the Court are:
a.

Whether defendants Mathis and Wright, acting in their individual

capacities, are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs' claims that they deprived
plaintiffs of well-established federal equal protection and/or due process rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, as alleged in plaintiffs' second cause of action.
b.

Whether defendants Mathis and Wright made representations to plaintiffs

concerning their ability to obtain building permits, and whether the County is therefore
estopped from denying such permits, as alleged in plaintiffs' fourth cause of action.
c.

Whether Ordinance 97-13 lasted longer than the six months permitted by

Utah Code Annotated § 17-27-404 and what equitable remedy should be granted, if any,
given the court's conclusion that Ordinance 97-13 has expired and is no longer being
enforced, as alleged in plaintiffs' sixth cause of action.
d.

Whether punitive damages against defendants Mathis and Wright are

appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as alleged in plaintiffs' fourteenth cause of action, or
whether they are immune from such damages under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

9
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DATED this i* *> day of September, 2001

jrtfuWyfy

BY-T]
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Attorneys for Defendants
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The parties' Cross-motions for Reconsideration came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable James R. Taylor on February 26, 2002; Craig V. Wentz and Barton H. Kunz II appearing for
defendants, and Gordon Duval appearing for plaintiffs. Upon reviewing the motions and memoranda,
and hearing the argument of counsel, the Court enters the following Order pursuant to Utah Code of
Judicial Administration 4-504.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
I.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
At the time Wasatch County ("County") enacted Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13 ("Ordinances" or

"moratoria") it was undisputed that neither plaintiffs nor defendants knew for sure how stable the
Canyon Meadows slopes were, or if they were suitable for construction of additional structures and the
installation of septic systems. The County implemented the building moratoria until these questions
could be answered. It is not necessary to make a specific finding whether or not the area subject to the
moratoria was indeed stable and/or suitable for further development. The fact that there was an
undisputed concern regarding slope stability, which related to the health and safety of Wasatch County
residents gave defendants a legitimate state interest, perhaps even a duty, to act as they did.
Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13 were, in designation and application, temporary moratoria that
affected the Canyon Meadows property for a finite period of time. Taking jurisprudence does not divide
a single parcel into discreet segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment
have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, the United Supreme Court focuses on the nature of the interference with the rights in the parcel
as a whole. Thus, in order for a taking to have occurred, a property owner's entire bundle of property
2

rights must have been taken, leaving no economically viable option to the property owner. Accordingly,
a land-use regulation that is, by its terms and application, temporary, meaning finite in duration, it is not
a taking. Although a regulation that merely masquerades as temporary could effect a taking, that
situation is not presented where, as here, plaintiffs' potential future uses of their property were
economically viable. Therefore, neither Ordinance 97-1 nor 97-13 constituted a taking of plaintiffs'
property.
Even if the moratoria prohibited all economically beneficial use of plaintiffs' land, the defendants
may utilize state land use regulations to abate nuisances. Thus, the County would likely be able to
identify background principles of nuisance and property law to sustain the Ordinances, even if they
constituted a taking.
The plaintiffs' challenge to the procedural validity of Ordinance 97-1 is untimely because it was
not made within thirty days as required by statute. Even assuming that the County gave no notice of
hearing for Ordinance 97-1, as plaintiffs allege, that omission would not have violated Utah's Open and
Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Annotated §§ 52-4-1 through -10 (not pleaded in Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint). Section §52-4-6(5) relieves public bodies of the notice requirements of §52-4-6(2) in
urgent circumstances. Temporary zoning regulations enacted under §17-27-404 constitute specific
exceptions to the notice requirements of the Utah Open Public Meetings Act because Section 404
applies where compelling, countervailing public interests are at stake. Accordingly, Ordinance 97-1 was
valid under both §52-4-6 and §17-27-404
Finally, City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1998), does not, as plaintiffs
contend, require a jury to determine the taking issue presented in this case, even if no genuine issue of
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material fact exists. Del Monte Dunes merely provides that taking issues involve mixed questions of
law and fact that may be presented to a jury in appropriate circumstances.
II.

DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Defendants' Cross-motion to Reconsider is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
A.

Section 1983 Claims Against Defendant Mathis

In their second memorandum opposing the County's Cross-motion to Reconsider, served just
three business days before the scheduled hearing on the parties' Cross-motions to Reconsider, plaintiffs
argued that Defendant Mathis should be denied qualified immunity because he (1) drafted Ordinances
97-1 and 97-13, and (2) did not inform plaintiffs he was doing so. (Plaintiffs' first memorandum in
opposition, served two months earlier, was limited to procedural issues.) At oral argument, plaintiffs
asserted a third reason for denying qualified immunity to Mathis; namely, that he enforced the moratoria
beyond the six months to which they were limited.
Mathis is immune from suit with respect to plaintiffs' first two claims. Mathis's conduct in
drafting the Ordinances constituted an integral step in the legislative process, thus entitling him to
absolute legislative immunity. Furthermore, Mathis had no duty to inform plaintiffs of legislation he
was drafting, nor did his drafting of the Ordinances or failure to inform plaintiffs thereof injure plaintiffs
because the Ordinances still had to be passed by the County's legislative body to become effective.
Plaintiffs' third claim that Mathis enforced the moratoria beyond their time limits is vague and
sparsely supported. Nonetheless, it creates a genuine issue of material fact that would require the Court
to weigh the evidence to determine if Mathis did or did not act properly. Accordingly, the County's
Cross-motion on this issue is denied.

4
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B.

Section 1983 Claims Against Defendant Wright

In their second memorandum opposing the County's Cross-motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs
alleged that Defendant Wright should be denied qualified immunity because (1) he required them to
perform percolation tests at a depth of four feet, ten inches, and (2) arbitrarily required percolation tests
of a certain quality and age from Canyon Meadows properties.
This Court is precluded from considering plaintiffs' first allegation regarding the depth of
percolation tests under the doctrine of res judicata. The propriety of requiring percolation tests at a
depth of four feet, ten inches was previously decided in another court. An action for the same claim was
dismissed with prejudice on December 22, 2000. As to plaintiffs' second claim, the Court finds that
there are some facts in the record that, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, may
indicate irregularities in the acceptance of Canyon Meadows percolation tests. Accordingly, the
County's Cross-motion on this issue is denied.
III.

REMAINING CLAIMS
Of Plaintiffs' fourteen original claims, only the following three issues remain:
1.

Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims for damages, including punitive damages, for unspecified

constitutional violations committed by Defendant Mathis for allegedly enforcing the moratoria beyond
six months, and by Defendant Wright for allegedly requiring percolation tests of a certain age and
quality for Canyon Meadows properties;
2.

Plaintiffs' equitable claim of zoning estoppel against the County; and

3.

Plaintiffs' equitable claim against the County that Ordinance 97-13 was enforced longer

than six months.

5

DATED this _j£_ day of April, 2002.
BY THE CO

-d0>'
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Craig V. Wentz, Utah Bar No. 3681
Barton H. Kunz II, Utah Bar No. 8827
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone (801) 323-5000
Facsimile (801) 355-3472
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 990401676
Division 8
Judge Gary D. Stott

JOHN and OLGA GARDNER et ai,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF WASATCH COUNTY et al.,

ORDER GRANTING WASATCH
COUNTY'S MOTION TO COMPEL

Defendants.

The Court, having considered the memoranda submitted on Wasatch County's Motion to
Compel and the arguments of counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, and good cause
appearing therefor, hereby ORDERS:

ft W1.

That within ^veD days after this order is filed:
(a)

*w
n

1/ . •

Plaintiffs shall respond to the following interrogatories propounded in

Defendants' Third Set of Written Discovery Requests as directed herein:
Interrogatory No. 1(c):
Plaintiffs shall specifically identify the clearly
established law they contend Defendant Mathis violated each time he allegedly

enforced the moratoria beyond six months.
Interrogatory No. 2(b):

Plaintiffs shall specifically identify the percolation test

standards they contend Defendant Wright should have applied to their properties,
either describing the standards with particularity or pinpoint citing the statute, rule,
ordinance, or policy where the standards are found.
Interrogatory No. 2(c):

Plaintiffs shall specifically identify each instance in

which, to their knowledge, Defendant Wright has applied the percolation test
standards they either described or cited in answer to Interrogatory 2(b) instead of the
percolation test standards he applied to their properties, including the date thereof,
the people involved, and Defendant Wright's alleged role.
Interrogatory No. 2(d):

Plaintiffs shall specifically identify each instance in

which they contend Defendant Wright applied the percolation test standards "of a
certain age and quality" they identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2(a) to their
properties, including the date thereof, the people involved, and Defendant Wright's
alleged role.
Interrogatory No. 2(e):

Plaintiffs shall specifically identify what entitlements

the individuals they have identified in response to this interrogatory contend they
have been denied as a result of Defendant Wright's application of the percolation test
standards identified in their answer to Interrogatory No. 2(a), including when they
were denied the entitlement and Defendant Wright's alleged role.
Interrogatory No. 2(g):

Plaintiffs shall specifically identify the clearly
2

established law they contend Defendant Wright violated each time he allegedly
applied the percolation test standards they identified in answer to Interrogatory No.
2(a) to their properties.
(b)

Plaintiffs shall serve and file executed verifications endorsing their answers to

the interrogatories propounded in Defendants' Third Set of Written Discovery
Requests and all supplements thereto.
(c)

Plaintiffs shall have provided Defendants with copies at Defendants' cost of

all documents responsive to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 1 & 2
propounded in Defendants' Third Set of Written Discovery Requests that they have
not already produced.
2.

That Plaintiffs shall pay Defendants' reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,

incurred in securing this order upon Defendants' counsel's filing of an affidavit itemizing such
expenses no later than seven days after this order is filed.

Dated this Jl_

day of

WtOMH

20j^

BY THE COURT:

JudgQ-Garyfo-Stott 'I"
'•';*,-1
Utah Fourth District Court, UtafTCounty

3
9"Qa

Craig V. Wentz, Utah Bar No. 3681
Barton H. Kunz II, Utah Bar No. 8827
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone (801) 323-5000
Facsimile (801) 355-3472
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOHN and OLGA GARDNER et ai,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF WASATCH COUNTY et ai,

Case No. 990401676
Division 8
Judge Anthony W. Schofield
ORDER LIMITING SUIT TO NAMED
PLAINTIFFS AND IMPOSING
SANCTIONS

Defendants.

The Court, having considered the memoranda submitted on Wasatch County's Motion
Limiting Suit to Named Plaintiffs and for Sanctions, the arguments of the parties' respective
counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby ORDERS:
1.

That this suit shall be limited to those plaintiffs named in the Amended Complaint

filed on December 16, 1999: John and Olga Gardner, Robert and Michelle Perez, Howard and
Helen Vanfleet, Victor and Linda Orvis, Hugh and Carolyn Allred, Helen Van Orman, Blake and
Nancy Roney, Aldo and Valerie Bussio, Dee and Wilmadean Olsen, and Steve and Bridget
Hirschfield.

2.

That any and all of these named plaintiffs who fail to provide certifications and/or

authorizations endorsing their answers to the interrogatories propounded in Defendants' Third
Set of Written Discovery Requests and all supplements thereto to the offices of Christensen &
Jensen, P.C., by 5.00 p.m. on tbe=^yih--bu5^^

shall be

sanctioned and considered to have been unable to answer those interrogatories, and shall thereby
be dismissed from this suit.

DATED this

I3

day of

AH

2005.

BY THE COURT:

Judge Anthony W. Schofield
Utah Fourth District Court, Utah County
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT

2

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

/ i f
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4

JOHN GARDNER, et al,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7

ORAL ARGUMENT

vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
et al,

CASE

990401676

8
Defendant.

JUDGE ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD

9
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12
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14
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that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on

September 20, 2005.
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7
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9

CRAIG V. WENTZ, ESQ.
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1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(September 20, 2005)

3

THE JUDGE:

Please be seated.

Counsel, it's good

4

to have you here in the matter of Gardner against Wasatch

5

County.

If you'd like to note your appearances please.

6

MR. DUVAL:

Yes.

I'm here, Gordon DuVal with my

7

clients Dee Olsen and (short inaudible, away from mic) on

8

behalf of the plaintiffs.

9

MR. WENTZ:

Your Honor, I'm Craig Wentz appearing

10

for Wasatch County.

11

colleague.

12

health director from Wasatch County, he is pleased to be here

13

this morning as well, or this afternoon.

14

Here with me is Bart Kunz, my

Also in the chambers is Mr. Phil Wright, the

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

I think I only have two

15

motions that are present.

Related to some of them though are

16

affidavits, or motions to strike affidavits.

17

choosing I, it doesn't matter, I'm not planning to rule from

18

the bench on either motion so it doesn't really matter to me

19

what order we go in.

20

MR. DUVAL:

If I were

Your Honor, I have some issues, some

21

concessions I think that will limit Mr. Wentz's discussion

22

and so some concessions on some of the points that I believe

23

^^e relevant, so maybe if I could take a few minutes and make

24

these acknowledgments that may limit things on the motion for

25

summary judgment.
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1

THE JUDGE:

That would be fine.

2

MR. DUVAL:

Thank you.

3

Your Honor, for the first time in my 20 years of

4

practice I'm standing before the court saying that I believe

5

it's in the best interest of this court and all the parties

6

that the court rule against my client on this apparent motion

7

for summary judgment.
There were many serious and weighty issues that

8
9
10

were raised in the complaint.

Judge Taylor's decision on

the first motion for summary judgment ruled against my client

1 1 on the bulk of those issues on most of those, the main
12

issues.

The essence and the heart of this lawsuit was

13

resolved by that motion, the previous motion for summary

14

judgment.
We are now left with the clean up, the remaining

15
16

straggling issues associated with this.

17

makes much sense at this point to participate in a lengthy

18

expensive trial that will ultimately have little or no impact

19

on the outcome of this case.

And let me explain why.

This is a takings case.

20

I don't believe it

It's a takings case that

21

raises many serious and important legal issues.

It raises

22

issues of such importance that the Pacific Legal Foundation

23

in Sacramento has approached us and has been willing for some

24

time assist us in reaching resolution of the takings

25

issues.

But the takings issues and the motions and the
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1

moritorium, all of those issues have essentially been taken

2

out of this case now.

3

those kind of claims are often tagalongs of the main takings

4

case, with the main thrust of the evidence now ruled legal by

5

the previous rulings we're left now with trying to show that

6

the remaining evidence proves two or three areas.

7

The due process equal protection,

Punitive damages is a very high threshold as the

8

court knows, shocking to the conscience.

The ability to

9

prove damages in a case of personal liability against the

10

individuals, it has to be personal animus and all the

11

standards that we talked about there.

12

If you don't mind I'd like to that just five, ten

13

minutes explaining what facts the jury will never see for the

14

record so I, so I can make a record of why I believe it's

15

appropriate at this point that we, that we allow this motion

16

to be granted, because I believe the facts that are necessary

17

to prove our case on these remaining issues have been

18

precluded by the previous motions for his summary judgment.

19
20
21

THE JUDGE:

I'm happy to let you do that, but I'm

trying to make sure I understand where you're going.
MR. DUVAL:

We believe that it's, it's appropriate

22

for the court to find as a matter of law that there's

23

insufficient evidence on the remaining issues in light of the

24

facts that we cannot present to the court based on the

25

previous rulings, to hold that there is, as a matter of law
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1

there is insufficient evidence to prove that we can go

2

forward on the remaining issues.

3

certification of a final appealable order is where we'd like

4

to end up, Your Honor.

5
6

THE JUDGE:

MR. DUVAL:
Your Honor.

9
10

MR. DUVAL:

17

No.

I agree.

Is there?

That's, that's the end

of it I think at that point.
THE JUDGE:

And then you can appeal I take it

Judge Taylor's rulings on the other summary judgment.

15
16

And if I do that under Rule 54(b) I'm

not sure that there's anything else left.

13
14

I believe that that's the case,

Yes.

THE JUDGE:

11
12

And thus just grant the motion for

summary judgment that Mr. Wentz has here?

7
8

We'd like to see a 54(b)

MR. DUVAL:

On everything, yes.

On the remaining

issues.
And I believe, Your Honor, and what I'd like to

18

show is that if we have, if we have the facts that are now

19

precluded by the previous motion we believe that we'd be able

20

to show that we are entitled to punitive damages, that we're

21

entitled to municipal estoppel, and that we're entitled to

22

1983 causes of action against the remaining defendants.

23

that evidence has now been taken from us by the previous

24

rulings that say that not only is it okay to have moritorium

25

that are stacked but, but it's okay to have moritorium

All
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1

without notices.

2

previously by the previous rulings as not illegal actions.

3

When we filed this complaint originally we believe those were

4

evidences of a pattern of conduct showing malice towards the

5

particular clients.

6

All those things have been ruled

THE JUDGE:

If I grant, if I, if I accept what

7

you've told me and grant the motion that would, for summary

8

judgment then I don't need to address either the motion to

9

amend the complaint.

10

MR. DUVAL:

I agree with that.

I believe both of

11

those motions, the affidavits and the other motion I believe

12

are moot because it only relates to a motion that's, that's

13

been resolved.

14
15

I agree, Your Honor.

THE JUDGE:

And you'd like to make a record simply

so that you have that record when you go up on appeal?

16

MR. DUVAL:

That's correct, Your Honor.

17

THE JUDGE:

Any objection, Mr. Wentz?

18

MR. WENTZ:

Your Honor, it certainly would have

19

been helpful had we known this before this very moment.

20

like if, if we may, Your Honor, I'd like, may we have a very

21

brief recess?

22

worried about the appellate record and the extent of

23

counsel's stipulation.

24

the legal issues raised, the findings of fact that we believe

25

can be made because they're undisputed, the motions to strike

I'd like to confer with my colleagues.

We would

I'd

We're

want to of course include

COURT PROCEEDINGS

being appropriate, if we can agree on those things.

But we

would like to perhaps with the court's permission just take
five minutes to evaluate how this affects the appellate
route.
THE JUDGE:
appropriate.

I certainly think that may be

I'm happy to take a 10, 15 minute recess and

let you and Mr. DuVal and others counsel however you'd like
to together.
MR. WENTZ:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE JUDGE:

I'll be here.

MR. WENTZ:

I think we could, we'll try to be done

I'm not going anywhere.

in 10 minutes.
THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

MR. DUVAL:

Thank you.
(Tape turned off).

MR. WENTZ:

Your Honor, I've just give Mr. DuVal

just a very brief review of our position.
follows.

We will be...

Our position is as

Again we're concerned that this

wouldn't raised earlier, but nevertheless we certainly don't
object to the court entering an order from the bench that
this case, all remaining issues in this case are hereby
dismissed with prejudice.

We would object to any further

statements of counsel, Your Honor, that might be later
characterized as evidence, as argument, or in any other
respect construed to be part of the record in this case

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

because it shouldn't be and it, and it wouldn't be.

2

stipulation is acceptable, if that approach is acceptable

3

that's our position.

4

record has been laboriously examined in the last six weeks,

5

put together, the facts are as they are, they've been clearly

6

established.

7

understanding that plaintiffs are conceding and desire a

8

dismissal order to be granted.

9

THE JUDGE:

10

We want the record to stand.

The law has been established.

Thank you.

If that

The fact

It's our

Mr. DuVal, what's your,

what's your view?
MR. DUVAL:

11

Yes, Your Honor.

I believe that the

12

points that I would raise are issues that are raised in the

13

previous motions for a summary judgment.

14

points that I was going to bring the court's attention to

15

since you didn't have the benefit of knowing in detail what

16

those previous arguments were I was going to raise those.

17

I'm not concerned that, that we do that in detail at this

18

point.

19

refers to statutes, all it is is statutes and ordinances.

And that, the

I have a handout that has a page and a half and just

20

THE JUDGE:

And what good does it do?

21

MR. DUVAL:

At this point if they're going to

22

brief it I don't know that we need to, Your Honor, because I

23

agree, if they're going to agree then I don't think it's

24

necessary because it is part of the record at this point.

25

think, I think that what I was going to draw the court's

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

attention to were previous rulings that you don't need to

2

know about at this point I don't believe since they've agreed

3

to it.

4

THE JUDGE:

I hear, I hear you saying, Mr. DuVal,

5

that your clients are prepared to essentially withdraw their

6

opposition to the motion for summary judgment and thus let me

7

just grant the summary judgment and dismiss this case.

8

that right?

9

I've either got to rule on the motion for summary judgment or

Is what what you're doing?

Is

In some fashion

10

else you've got to stipulate to a dismissal of the remaining

11

claims, or we've got to go to trial.

12

my three choices.

13

MR. DUVAL:

I think those are about

Your Honor, we believe that we've

14

presented a record to the court in response to the motion for

15

summary judgment which is the best record we can present.

16

have to present the story of we believe violations.

17

believe because of the previous rulings we can tell the jury

18

about page six, page 28, page 55.

19

we believe we're precluded from saying.

20

we need to have the record of the court of the best evidence

21

that we can present of, of what the defense, what our

22

arguments are in response to the motion to summary judgment.

23

So we don't want those pleadings ignored, we want the court

24

to take those into account.

25

professional opinion at this point that we're not going to be

We

We

But the rest of the pages
So I believe that

I'm just saying that it's my
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1

able to cross the high hurdles because the facts that we need

2

to present to the court have been precluded by previous

3

rulings of the Fourth District Court.

4

THE JUDGE:

So I hear you saying that, that it's

5

your view as counsel for the plaintiffs that in the, when

6

push comes to shove that you can't adequately defeat the

7

motion, you can't, that your, the facts are not there for you

8

to adequately defeat the motion for summary judgment and thus

9

I possibly should grant it.

10

MR. DUVAL:

At this point, Your Honor, that's

1 1 exactly right.
12

MR. WENTZ:

I think I'm with you, Your Honor.

We

13

think the only appropriate remedy would be as you just stated

14

that summary judgment be entered since they are not opposing

15

our motion.

16

And, Your Honor, we have concern about any other

17

discussions about decisions because counsel has already

18

mischaracterized some of Judge Taylor's rulings.

19

we just need to focus on the summary judgment that's before

20

the court now.

21

THE JUDGE:

So I think

I want to solve the summary judgment

22

issue very first.

23

you're conceding that you don't believe that you can

24

adequately defend against it on the record that exists today.

25

And I hear you, Mr. DuVal, saying you are,

MR. DUVAL:

That's correct, Your Honor.

We

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

prepared the best defense we could, we gathered every

2

document that we could we felt would address those issues.

3

But much of what we'd like to say we can't say in the motion

4

for summary judgment.

5

THE JUDGE:

I understand that.

6

MR. DUVAL:

The evidence isn't there now because

7

it's all been precluded by previous motions.

With what we

8

have at this point I don't believe we can support the high

9

threshholds.

These are not just by the preponderance of the

10

evidence, Your Honor.

11

issues have very high threshholds that would reguire shocking

12

to the conscience and, and we believe those things, the

13

evidence has now been precluded so that I cannot effectively

14

defend against those motions.

15

MR. WENTZ:

As you know the three remaining

Your Honor, I hear him saying he'll,

16

he'll agree on the record that our motion for summary

17

judgment should be granted, and we'll reserve all further

18

arguments about quite simply, Your Honor, there's never been

19

any previous evidence withheld or excluded in this case.

20

THE JUDGE:

Well, I hear him saying that he, that

21

he doesn't believe that, that he believes that ultimately the

22

motion for summary judgment must be granted.

23

MR. WENTZ:

I think that's fair.

24

THE JUDGE:

And based upon that I'm going to grant

25

the defendant's motion for a summary, for a summary judgment
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1

in this case which I believe results in a dismissal of all of

2

the claims in this case, some previously having been

3

dismissed and now these are dismissed.

4

enter such an order.

5

dismissal order.

6

next.

And I'm prepared to

Let Mr. Wentz prepare an appropriate

And then you can go whatever is appropriate

7

MR. WENTZ:

Thank you, Your Honor.

8

THE JUDGE:

And I don't know that there's any more

9

that I can or should on do this afternoon.

10

MR. DUVAL:

I agree, Your Honor, I think that's

THE JUDGE:

Very well.

1 1 it.
12

I'm going to grant the

13

defendant's motion.

14

appropriate order, and as soon as it's been approved as to

15

form or the appropriate time has passed I'll sign it.

16

go to phase two, whatever phase two is.

17

front of me, that much I know.

18

MR. DUVAL:

19

Direct Mr. Wentz that you prepare an

Then

It won't be in

Thank you, Your Honor.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

20
21
22
23
24
25
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
2
STATE OF UTAH

)

3

)
COUNTY OF UTAH

SS

)

4
5
6

I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and

7

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify

8

that I received the electronically recorded court CD

9

#05-36-401

in the matter of Gardner v Board of County

10

Commissioners, hearing date September 20, 2005, and that I

11

transcribed it into typewriting and that a full, true and

12

correct transcription of said hearing so recorded and

13

transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 1

14

through 14, inclusive except where it is indicated that the

15

tape recording was inaudible.

16
17

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 4th day of
October, 2005.
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Craig V. Wentz, Utah Bar No. 3681
Barton H. Kunz II, Utah Bar No 8827
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone (801) 323-5000
Facsimile (801) 355-3472
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOHN and OLGA GARDNER et al,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 990401676
Division 8
Judge Anthony W. Schofield

v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF WASATCH COUNTY et al,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING
COUNTY'S SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants

The Court, having considered the parties" memoranda submitted on defendants' motion for
summary judgment and plaintiffs' counsel's representation at oral argument held on September 20,
2005, that plaintiffs could not successfully oppose that motion, and good cause appearing therefor,
the Court hereby ORDERS:
1.

That Wasatch County's Second Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED

for the reasons and based upon the facts presented by and the arguments asserted in defendants'
supporting and reply memoranda, and all remaining claims in this case are therefore DISMISSED

3S61

WITH PREJUDICE.
2.

Upon the Court's granting of Wasatch County's Second Motion for Summary

Judgment, the plaintiffs' pending motion to amend their amended complaint and the defendants'
pending motions to strike the affidavits of Victor Orvis, Dee Olsen, Peter deJonge, and Tom Hicken
are rendered moot.

Accordingly, it is hereby ADJUDGED that plaintiffs' case is dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to this Order and all prior dispositive decisions and orders in this case.

DATED this Z l d a y o f

, 2005.

r

BY THE COURT:

Judge Anthony W. Schofiela
Utah Fourth District Court, Utah County
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moo
Craig V. Wentz, Utah Bar No. 3681
Barton H. Kunz II, Utah Bar No. 8827
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone (801) 323-5000
Facsimile (801) 355-3472
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN and OLGA GARDNER et al,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 990401676
Division 8
Judge Anthony W. Schofield

v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF WASATCH COUNTY et al.,

ORDER AWARDING DEFENDANTS'
FEES AND EXPENSES

Defendants.

The Court, having considered the memoranda and oral arguments submitted on Defendants'
Motion for Fees and Expenses, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby FINDS:
1.

Plaintiffs knew or should have known upon responding to defendants' narrowly

tailored written discovery requests on July 26,2002, that they had insufficient factual grounds upon
which to succeed on their claims remaining after the Court's prior rulings on the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment and to reconsider.
2.

Plaintiffs nonetheless continued to vigorously litigate these claims unnecessarily.

39

3.

Plaintiffs ultimately conceded they had insufficient grounds for their remaining

claims, but not until the moment of oral argument on defendants' motion for summary judgment. At
that point, several other motions had been decided, and several more had been fully briefed and were
awaiting decision.
4.

Defendants have prevailed on all claims brought by plaintiffs in this case.

5.

Defendants' calculation of hours is reasonable and supported by contemporaneous

and detailed records of time. Defendants' counsel does not include any irrelevant, unrelated,
redundant, excessive or otherwise unnecessary hours in its calculation.
6.

Based on the Court's own experience, the orders defendants' counsel has submitted,

and defendants' counsels' affidavits, the rates requested by defendants' counsel and staff are
reasonable and are similar to or lower than the rates of lawyers in the area of comparable skill and
experience.
7.

The defendants' calculation of expenses is reasonable and supported by

contemporaneous and detailed records. Defendants' counsel has reduced the costs requested using
the same criteria used to reduce its requested fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court ORDERS:
1.

Plaintiffs shall pay defendants the amount of $74,319.71 forthwith, representing the

sum of reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred in defense of this suit since July 26, 2002.

2

3966

DATED this _J_ day of
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BY THE COURT:

it- H ^ w

)\^t4tt'i

Judge Anthony :W Schofield
Utah Fourth District Court, Utah County
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May 10. 1994
Mr. Bob Ma this
Wasatch
County
25 North,
Main
Heber City, Utah
RE:
Dear

Hoovers

Planner
84032

Slide and the Canyon

Meadows

Development.

Bob:

We are currently in the design process of US 189 from the Wasatch/Utah
County line to the
Deer Creek State Park.
We have recently
drilled 26 observation
wells and
installed
inclonometers
to monitor the movement of the Hoover Slide. The data that we have received
to this point indicates that there is substantial
movement in the slide and the depth of
movement
is such that it is not likely that the slide can be stabilized:
This creates a problem
when trying to use the alignment that was specified in the SE1S at the Horseshoe Bend are*
Tms area called for two structures
that would require bridge abutments and piers to be
located on the active slide (site map is attached).
We are presently in the process of drillinq
more observation
wells and installing instrumentation
at site specific locations to further
evaluate
the problem.
^This has forced us to look at other alignment options in this area, due to the
problems
;- associated
with bridge and retaining structures on active slides. One viable alternative
would
f?e to go through the saddle above the Horseshoe Bend area and cross through the bottom of
jne canyon meadows area. We would still be on the slide, but there would be no
structures
wit.i this alignment, and maintenance
costs would be minimized.
The concern we have at this point in the design is the amount of development that
Wasatc^
bounty
is going to allow in this area. The proposed roadway would go throuch the planned
commercial
area that is proposed by the developers, but would not encroach on any of the
16u lots contained in the master plan. However, there would be increased visual end noise
impacts to the community,
i he roadway would be visible as it comes through the saddle
but
men would be depressed through the meadow to minimize the impact
Mr Engebre'sen
is
tr.e ceveicper of the area, and has voiced his concerns and possible legal action that
maybe
tax en if a road is placed a: the proposed
location.
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have been led to believe that We J BO uFJfdevehpmeiiil*,!!!

handle-the~wa~s}e'^-er

Mr. Bob Ma this
Wasatch County Planner
May 70, 1994
Sirough'a septic S'/stem. This may pose a serious impact to the Hoover Slide, and could
impaci any of the roadway alignments that are in this area. I have attached a copy of a letter
and a reporr dealing with this subject for your information that was compiled by a consultant
working on the project.
$tt~7s Important that the'Vtah Department of Transportation find out the extent of which the
development will be able to continue, so that a decision can be made on how to proceed with
£lhis project.
We are moving along with this project at a very fast pace, and we hope that
these questions can be answered quickly to prevent any delay to this project. Your help will
be greatly appreciated.
If you have any questions or concerns please contact me at

227-8058.

Randall R. Park, P.E.
Project Manager

cc:

Hal M. Clyde
Kim Schvaneveldt
P.K. Mohanty '
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June 24. 1996
Mr. Phil D. Wright
Wasatch Cicy-Counry Health Department
805 West 100 South
P.O. Box 246
Heber City, UT 84032
Dear Phil:
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Because of the relatively high potential for STSA-system failure in expansive soil a
properly conducted percolation test with 2 Sufficient pre-soaking of the soil is critical for'
meaningful test results. If the soil is not soaked for a sufficient"amount of time prior to
measuring percolation rates, the clay minerals may not expand to the degree thev are caoable
and the percolation race will not accurately reflect the soil's saturated hydraulic conductivity.'
t i n e U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recommends keeping the test hole full of water
"...for at least 4 hours and preferably overnight if clav soils are present," and then measuring
percolation rates at least 15 hours but DO more than 30 hours, after the soaking period besan =
t (U.S. EPA, 1980, Design Manual, Onsite WastewaterTreatmenc and Disposal Systems)* In
Ageneral, an overnight pre-soak is warranted for any percolation test in clayey soils derived
from the Manning Canyon Shale.
In addition to being ffiSESHlcrforSTSA systems", the Manning Canyon Shale is also
susceptible to landsliding in pan because it is expansive. Lot 13B is near the head of a lar^e
prehistoric landslide (Hoover slide as mapped by Delta Geotechnical Consultants, Inc 1994
unpublished consultant's report). Old landslides can reactivate under certain circumstances^'
and increased grcasd moisiure associated with STSA-system effluent can-reduce the stability
or slopes. I recommend the lot owners be made aware of these conditions, as well as the
possibility for STSA-system failure associated wTth expansive soils.
I trust this provides the information you need at this time. Please call if you have anv
questions regarding this letter or require additional information.
Sincerely,

Michael D. Hylland, Project Geologist
Applied Geology Program

March 11/1996
'Wasatch County Planning Commission
Heber City, Wasatch County, Utah
Re:

Comments on: The Proposed New Canyon Meadows Development Plan Submitted
by the Engebretsens under the name of New Canyon Meadows LC (NCM LC)

ADDENDUM # 1
CANYON MEADOWS CONCERNED HOMEOWNERS -- 4/15/96
NEW ISSUE(l) As lot owners we are concerned with the possible liability nfthp^ Canyon
Meadows Homeowners Association (CMHOA) in the event of a catastrophic failure of the septic
drain fields on the Meadow. The CMHOA would be liable and be forced to install a sewage
treatment plant at considerable cost to each lot owner.j;The percolation tests performed by other
engineering: firms have shown the majority of the lots have failed their percolation tests. However
when Arden A. Engebretsea, the developer, personally re-performed the percolation tests the
majority of the sites passed. It is a little worrisome that Arden A. Engebretsen, a non-engineer,
was able to make the majority of the lots he has for sale, pass the percolation test when qualified
engineers indicated otherwise. If Wasatch County feels obligated to allow further development on
Canyon Meadows, it is the position of the CMHOA ,they must take the responsibility for
installing a sewage treatment plant on the Canyon Meadow Development in the event of a
catastrophic failure of the septic drain fields. The alternative to this is that the Developer should
be required to install a sewage treatment plant which would be sufficient to take care of both
current and future approved development on the meadow.
NEW ISSUE(2) The Canyon Meadows Homeowners are concerned about over-development on
the Meadow and the potential environmental impact which would result. According to W.
Kenneth Hamblin1 the Meadow is an ancient mud-flow which has been stabilized in a natural way
— by time. The surface and ground water systems are in equilibrium and there is no active motion
of this slide area at the present time. The current meadow, soil-climate ecosystem, equilibrium is
characterized as semi-arid with approximately 12-15 inches of rain fall per year. As a result of
over-development this soil-climate equilibrium could abruptly be converted to a rajpfnrest
equivalent ecosystem ha\dn&i&()-300 inches of water per year resulting from irrigation and
watering of lawns. This could have catastrophe results for the canyon meadows' homeowners by
wfaatjs known as subsidence. Subsidence is defined as the downward movement of earth material
lying at or near the earths surface. It differ from other types of mass movement in that movement
is essentially vertical; there is little or no horizontal component.
Hamblin and Christainsen (Professors of Geology, Brigham Young University) have
written:; Perhaps the most devastating type of subsidence results from the expansion and
contraction of soils. The process may at first seem harmless enough, but it has created a disaster
largely unknown by the general public and ignored by the government. When dry, expansive soils

873

are hard and strong, they are almost like rock, but when water is added, expand and soften. Some
clay-rich soils will expand over fifteen times its dry volume. Expansion of one and a half times the
dry volume is common. When fully saturated withj^atejjh^ojejoils lose much of their strgggjh
- and become soft and slippery^much like lubncaunj-grease, Upon drying they shnrA^ajisjngjhe^
structures built upon them to collapse.
The shrinking and swelling of sojlsjiflict enormous loss-of homes, commercial buildings,
roads and^uSeTrniTThe average annllaTtosIto"the Unites_StgeMS_more than $2.3 billion, more
™d earthquakes combined. It is a secret
tn!nl^c7Tn^s~fr^frr^^
dis^itiFu^foSm7tely the government haTdone nothing to mitigate expansive soil damage. We
spend billions of dollars on flood-control projects but essentially nothing to protect ourselves from
loss due to expansive soils. This is in part because the disaster from expansive soils is not
sensational It happens to individuals one by one throughout the country. Lets avoid a major
disaster like that in St. George, Utah, where over development has led to excessive subsidence
and building losses of many millions of dollars.
Hamblin1 also indicates that changing the water soil equilibrium may change the
equilibrium soil stacking-angle and possibly abruptly trigger motion of the ancient mud flow at
Canyon Meadows. The equilibrium soil stacking-angle is defined as the anglefromthe horizontal
which a particular soil naturally attains as it is piled up on a horizontal surface from a dump truck
or by natural deposition. This angle depends on the type of soil, the density of the material, the
shape of the panicles, and the water content. The addition of water adds both additional mass and
it also acts as a lubricant and will therefore change the equilibrium of this ecosystem.
NEW ISSUE(3) The Canyon Meadows Homeowners are concerned about the potential
environmental impact which will result when the new highway and 76 additional homes are
constructed on the meadow. The Meadow is an ancient mud-flow which has been stabilized in a
natural way - by time. The surface and ground water systems are in equilibrium and there is no
active motion of this slide area at the present time. Any major construction projects such as the
building of the new highway and the building of 76 additional homes on the meadow could destabilize and destroy the surface and ground water ecosystems equilibrium. The meadow is vgy
fragile and any major b u i l d j n j j ^ r o j e x t s j ^
the~rr^adoVh£s^
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the road there ' If Wasatch County feels comfortable in approving additional development in
canyon meadows, the CMHOA will hold the Wasatch County responsible for the geologic
consequences of this development. Furthermore, the State of Utah Department of Transportation
must also assume responsibility for possible de-stabilization of the Meadow if the new highway
t r i o r s movement of this ancient mud-flow, and for any changes in the
^J^*™**ThTcatastrophic environmental impact of the new highway has been partially addressed by the
oeoloeist hired by the NCM LC and discussed in volume II of the document submitted to
2
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J racy nicharcson
Literature Review
Canyon Meadows Subdivision
Upper Frovo Canyon
Wasatch County, Utah
Project No. S730SQ
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The U D O T report stales "The data from jnciincmeters in the Canyon Meadows slice area
reveal tr.at t n e entire slide mass is creeping a* a siow rate (about 3 to 20 millimeters per y e a r ; ,
generally to the east/southeast (toward tne river). Tne rate cf ground movement
increases
d r a m a t i c a l l y near the w e s t sice of U.S. 1E2, as a result of the side hiil road c u t s . "
The A G - A report states "Based upon the data described herein, it is our opinion that t h e areas
c f active m o v e m e n t in the Canyon Meaczvjs area are along the highway and the i n s t a b i l i t y
was causae by grading cone for highway construction and maintenance. We see no e v i d e n c e
t n a t tr.e C a n y o n Meadows subdivision is within the presently active portion of the K c c v e r
s i i c e . " A G R A also recommends that surface monitoring points be established in the Canyon
M e a d o w s area and monitored on a quarterly basis.
U D G T c u n d u c t e d laboratory testing to determine strength parameters of the slide m a t e r i a l s .
T h e y m o d e l e d the siice configuration in the area of the proposed roadway and obtained s a f e t y
f a c t o r s against slope failure of approximately 1.3 for the proposed highway alignment b e l o w
tne C a n y o n M e a d o w s area. There is no indication that they evaluated the overall s t a b i l i t y o:

i he AG.-.A and UDOi records cz not azzress the safety factor against slope failure for t h e
iarcer s;:cs mass cf Canyon M e a c c w s .
Eased en the safety factors determined for the Hoover slide in the area of the
oroczsez
h i g h w a y alignment, and AGF.A's recommenced future monitoring of the Hoover landslide, w e
r e c o m m e n d additional analysis be conducted for the overall stability of the Hoover landslide
;n tne area cf Canyon Meadows subdivision to provide a better estimate of the risk cf slope

S u c n a s t u d y w o u l d generailv consist c: cefir.ir.c the subsurface conditions, the s t r e n g t h s o;
tne so;.' anc zedrzzK an"* r~cncu'"*t;r.e a stacti11v analysis.

ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS. INC.
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orinckerhcff, Cloaca a.nc uc^aiaa. inc., 1SS-, Georeonnicai Engineering c^rucy,
F:a~.a::ed Aiicnment of :r.e U . S . - l c S Widening Frciect from Wiidwccd to Deer Creek
S r a t e Park, Prove Csnvon, Utah: uncubiishec consultant's racer: fcr C e n t e n n i a ;
Engineering, Inc., 74 c.

rcii-~icn CcnT~~i Encin~- r inc In* l c c 2 An Encineerinc uesicn Feoort fcr a W a s t e w a t e r
T r e a t m e n t riant fcr the Canyon Meadows Development, Frcvc, Utah.
Fciiins, Ercv/n and Gtinne!!, Inc., 1S7S, Soils and Foundation Investigation -Carver R e c e p t i o n
C e n t e r , Frcvo Canyon, Utah: Prove, Utah, unpublished consultant's repcr:, 5 p.
Utah Geologic Survey, Engineering Geoicgic Map Foiic, Western Wasatch County, Utah, Open
Fiie F.eoort 31 S.
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Gordon W. Duval, Bar No. 6532
Brian K. Haws, Bar No. 8198
"Trey" A.R. Dayes III, Bar No. 7504
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P C .
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
Telephone:
(801) 785-5350
Facsimile:
(801) 785-0853
Attorneys for Canyon Meadows Homeowners Association
IN T H E FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T IN AND F O R
UTAH COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH
100 West 125 North, Provo, Utah 84603
John and Olga Gardner, Individually; Robert and
Michelle Perez, Individually; Howard and Helen
Vanfleet, Individually; Victor and Linda Orvis,
Individually; Hugh and Carolyn Allred,
Individually; Helen Van Orman, Individually;
Blake and Nancy Roney, Individually; Aldo and
Valerie Bussio, Individually; Dee and Wilmadean
Olsen, Individually; Steve and Bridget Hirschfield,
Individually; and John Does 1-72,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch
County, a Legislative Body, Wasatch County, a
Political Subdivision; Bob Mathis, Wasatch
County Planner and Individually; Phil Wright,
Wasatch County Health Director and Individually;
Ralph Duke, Wasatch County Commissioner and
Individually; Michael Kohler, Wasatch County
Commissioner and Individually; Laren Provost,
Wasatch County Commissioner and Individually;
Keith Jacoboson, Individually; Sharron Winterton,
Individually,
Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH
JURY DEMAND

T/c'/c 355*/

Civil No. 990405^554

Judge James R. Taylor

COMES NOW plaintiffs by and through counsel and hereby files this Amended Complaint
and hereby alleges as follows:
IDENTITY OF PARTIES
1.

Plaintiffs John and Olga Gardner own lot Al and Condos Jll &J12 in the Canyon Meadows

Subdivision.
2.

Plaintiffs Robert and Michelle Perez own lot A6 in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision.

3.

Plaintiffs Howard and Helen Vanfleet own lot A8 in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision.

4.

Plaintiffs Victor and Linda Orvis own lot Al 1 in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision.

5.

Plaintiffs Hugh and Carolyn Allred own lot A22 in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision.

6.

Plaintiff Helen Van Orman owns lot A48 in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision.

7.

Plaintiffs Blake and Nancy Roney own lot B9 in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision.

8.

Plaintiffs Aldo and Valerie Bussio own lot B13 in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision.

9.

Plaintiffs Dee and Wilmadean Olsen own lot B17 in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision.

10.

Plaintiffs Steve and Bridget Hirschfield own lot B20 in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision.

11.

Plaintiffs John Does 1-69 currently own lots and/or homes in the Canyon Meadows

Subdivision or have owned lots and/or homes in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision during the
period from 1997 to the present.
12.

Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch County is a legislative body of elected

officials that have been empowered to manage the affairs of Wasatch County.
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13.

Bob Mathis was the County Planner for Wasatch County and continues to act in that

capacity with respect to the Canyon Meadows Subdivision, and is an individual believed to live in
Wasatch County, State of Utah.
14.

Phil Wright is the Wasatch County Health Director and is an individual believed to live in

Wasatch County, State of Utah.
15.

Ralph Duke is a current Wasatch County Commissioner and is an individual believed to

live in Wasatch County, State of Utah.
16.

Michael Kohler is a current Wasatch County Commissioner and is an individual believed

to live in Wasatch County, State of Utah.
17.

Laren Provost is a current Wasatch County Commissioner and is an individual believed to

live in Wasatch County, State of Utah.
18.

Keith Jacoboson is a former Wasatch County Commissioner and is an individual believed

to live in Wasatch County, State of Utah.
19.

Sharron Winterton is a former Wasatch County Commissioner and is an individual

believed to live in Wasatch County, State of Utah.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
20.

Jurisdiction of this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-4, et. seq.

and pursuant to § 17-27-1001.
21.

Venue of this action is properly had and laid in Wasatch County, State of Utah pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 71-13-7 by reason that the causes of action herein arose in Wasatch County,
3
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and additionally pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-13-1 as the real property that is the
subject of this suit is located in Wasatch County, State of Utah.
FACTS
22.

From 1977 to 1985, Wasatch County considered and approved three plats (A, B, and C)

and two condominium projects in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision. During this eight year
process Wasatch County repeatedly reviewed and considered health and safety factors related to
slope stability and the use of individual septic systems in the platted areas. Each and every time
Wasatch County reviewed the subdivision it found that individual septic systems were feasible and
that there were no serious concerns with slope stability.
23.

A 1964 ground water study and geological report presented to Wasatch County indicated

that the area sits on a very old, but stable fault zone with alluvial soils in a silt loom that has a
plastic characteristic. The report indicated that the region is stable, but also stated that it is very
important that bearing penetrometer, direct vane shear, and soil density tests be made by any
group interested in the property.
24.

In January of 1977, one of the original environmental impact statements provided to the

county acknowledged that excessive amounts of water from flood irrigation may have caused
sloughing along the highway.
25.

In June of 1977, the State Division of Health advised the Wasatch County Health

Department to take special care in reviewing the area's suitability for individual septic systems and
that it should confirm subsurface soil conditions and other subdivision features. The State
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Division of Health identified particular concerns with the possibility of relative shallow ground
water and the nature of the clay in the area.
26.

An August 1978 letter from Bare, Hintze and Rigby, geological consultants to Robert

Mathis acknowledged the two principal concerns with development in Canyon Meadows are
slope stability and water related problems. The consultants stated that the property is mostly
located on a formation that is for the most part impervious and which can be unstable when wet
or put under extreme loads at the unconfined perimeters. The letter further informed Mr. Mathis
that this is a serious problem and that the formation's stability is proportional to the amount of
water it contains. The letter then goes on to suggest that drainage and sprinkler irrigation would
mitigate these risks.
27.

In August of 1978, the State Division of Health gave its recommendation as to the use of

individual septic systems for the first 42 lots (Plat A) in Canyon Meadows. Based on the fact that
the Wasatch County Health Department and staff from the state had conducted on-site inspections
and found the soil generally suitable for septic systems, the Division of Health found that
individual waste disposal systems in the subdivision were feasible and that "such systems could be
installed on the majority of lots in accordance with minimum state regulations." (Exhibt E).
28.

In September of 1978, in a response to an inquiry made by Robert Mathis, the Utah

Geological and Mineral Survey (UGMS) voiced its concern about the soil composition in Canyon
Meadows and advised the county of the potential for problems that could result from a high
concentration of individual septic systems.
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29.

In August of 1979, the state health department reviewed Phase II (Plat B) of the

subdivision. The state informed Phil Write that despite the fact that the majority of the
percolation tests passed, there were still concerns that the soils in Plat B may generally not be
suitable for individual septic systems or that generally the area in Plat B would not meet the
requirement of having four feet of suitable soil. The state pointed out that it was feasible to use
individual septic systems in Phase I, but that if further use of individual septic was to be pursued
in Phase II, all further tests should be carefully monitored by the local health department.
30.

On September 7, 1979, Robert Mathis informed the Wasatch County Commission that

the planning commission reviewed the development plans, made a field trip to the site, and found
the plans were consistent with the Provo Canyon Master Plan and the Wasatch County Master
Plan.
31.

In October of 1979, the Wasatch County Planning Commission recommended that the

preliminary approval should be granted to the subdivision based on the condition that the first 47
units would have septic tanks, but that the rest of the development would have to connect to an
approved septic system If an approved septic system could not be arranged then further
development would have to cease.
32.

On December 21, 1979, Robert Mathis recommended to the county commission that Plat

A of the subdivision be given preliminary approval. The Wasatch County Commission granted
preliminary approval to the first phase only using septic tanks, with subsequent phases to be
submitted to the health department for approval using a community sewage disposal system.
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33.

On August 6, 1980, Canyon Meadows sought a recommendation for final approval from

the planning commission. Robert Mathis informed the planning commission that the development
was ready for the approval with only minor items, such as road and curbing, needing additional
attention.
34.

On January 2, 1981, the Wasatch County Commission found that Plat A met the county

requirements and therefore granted final approval for 47 lots in phase I of the development.
35.

In June of 1982, Canyon Meadows approached the planning commission concerning ten

condominium lots. The commission asked Phil Wright to explain the soil conditions in the area
and he stated that he did not think the soil was acceptable for drain fields. Robert Mathis
recommended the developer get a letter from the health department showing the water and sewer
plans were acceptable.
36.

In July of 1982, Phil Wright reported to the county commission on the feasibility of

individual septic systems in Plat B. Mr. Wright informed the commission that four lots would
require a drain field in the common area and that "[a]ll other lots have percolation tests that meet
minimum requirements of the state code." Mr. Wright informed the commission that septic
systems were feasible in Plat B, with close supervision of the testing and irfttallation of the
disposal systems.
37.

In February on 1983, the state health department acknowledged that the county had

"reviewed and approved construction of septic tank drain fields in 48 lots in Phase I and 26 Lots
in Phase II." The state went on to confirm that the county "carefully reviewed the site conditions
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with the Bureau of General Sanitation, the Bureau of Public Water Supplies and the Utah
Geological and Mineral Survey and the requirements of the Code of Waste Disposal Regulations
before approving the lots."
38.

One May 18, 1983, The Wasatch County Commission found that Plat B satisfied the

county concerns and requirements and using specific guidelines, granted final approval of Plat B.
39.

After the approval of Plat B, the developer continued its attempts to secure approval for a

Plat C. In July of 1984, UGMS reviewed data on the proposed expansion of the subdivision. The
reported indicated that, based on test pit examination and percolation testing, septic tank
absorption fields could function properly in the proposed expansion area. The report stated that
although the site appeared to be located on landslide deposits, the soil development and secondary
cementation represented a long period of stability. The report recognized that extensive
disturbance and introduction of irrigation or wastewater associated with expansive development
could cause slope stability problems. The report also recommended that the county should do a
slope stability analysis prior to development.
40.

In July of 1984, Phil Wright prepared a memo for Robert Mathis informing him of

UGMS's position on the expansion of the subdivision and advised Mr. Mathis that he may want
to pursue the recommendation that a slope stability analysis be performed prior to development.
41.

Mr. Wright then informed the planning and county commissions that individual

wastewater disposal was feasible for plat C of Canyon Meadows. Mr. Wright did not indicate
that any special requirements would be needed for the testing or installation of individual septic
8

systems on Plat C. i. On August 21, 1985, the Wasatch County Commission granted preliminary
approval for Plat C.1
42.

Each time an additional plat or condominium projects was to be added to the subdivision,

the county reviewed the septic and slope issues to determine the impact of that addition. Through
its approval process Wasatch County found that the soil conditions on Plats A, B, and C fell
within the requisite safety parameters established by the state and the county.
43.

Based on these approvals, roads were constructed, under ground utility lines for water,

electricity and phone were installed and lots were sold in plats A & B. Over a period-of years, a
significant number of lots were sold to over 40 different property owners and over seventeen
structures were built in the subdivision. This infrastructure and many of these buildings have
been in Canyon Meadows for decades without any damage or failures related to slope or soil
conditions.
44.

In 1993, the Utah Department of Transportation commissioned an extensive geological

study to be preformed in Provo Canyon in anticipation of expanding Highway 189. That study
indicated areas near the river and below Canyon Meadows were moving. The study reported that
there were indications that the entire mass was "creeping at a very slow pace (at a rate of 5 to 10
mm per year)." The study also noted that 1994 comparisons of aerial photographs from 1953 and
1984 showed no movement Parsons Brinckerhoff Geotechnical Study 56 (1994).

Although the County approved Plat C, it was never recorded due to difficulties experienced by the
original developer.
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45.

When UDOT learned that New Canyon Meadows (NCM), a developer in the area,

planned on expanding Canyon Meadows to nearly double the size of Plats A and B using only
individual septic systems, it expressed its concerns to Wasatch County that 160 units could pose a
serious impact on the area. UDOT indicated that due to movement near the road, which is not in
the Canyon Meadows platted area, it was looking to move the highway closer to the more stable
areas near the subdivision. UDOT was concerned that doubling the size of the residential
development in the area could impact the stability of an area which they felt was a viable option
for realignment of the highway.
46.

When informed of UDOT's concerns, NCM commissioned AGRA Earth and

Environmental, a geotechnical engineering firm to evaluate the new study. AGRA reviewed the
study and presented its opinions relating to expansion of the development. AGRA pointed out
that the movement the UDOT study reported was so very small that it could have been related to
the settling of the instrumentation used to detect slope movement and that it could not be used to
indicate a certain trend in movement of the area without more data. AGRA did indicate that
stability monitoring would be reasonable, but again, this report expressly indicated its scope was
limited to addressing the expansion project by the NCM.
47.

Wasatch County asked Michael Hylland of the Utah Geological Survey to review the

AGRA report. Mr. Hylland agreed with AGRA's conclusion that the landslide was inactive, but
that the toe of the slide, located near the heavy fill areas associated with the present highway, was
subject to movement. Mr. Hylland agreed that future development and expansion of the
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subdivision and highway construction could change that status and recommended review of
NCM's grading plans prior to construction. Mr. Hylland further recommended site specific slope
stability evaluations for the steeper lots in order to provide appropriate site specific
recommendations.
48.

In his review of the AGRA report, which addressed the expansion of the subdivision

beyond Plats A and B, Hylland focused on the need for appropriate recommendations for
individual construction sights, not an area-wide moratorium.
49.

In the spring of 1996 Phil Wright requested Mr. Hylland to evaluate soil condition on one

lot in Plat B. Mr. Hylland reviewed the soils and then repeated the cautions given to Mr. Wright
in 1979 that due to the soil types the percolation testing needed to be performed carefully with
adequate swelling periods. Again, Mr. Hylland did not give any indication that individual septic
system were not feasible or that they would not function properly if the proper testing and
installation was performed.
50.

In fact, during the history of Canyon Meadows, no septic system has failed due to soil

conditions, design, or installation problems. In late December of 1996, a septic system at a condo
at the Junipers required some attention. Prior to this time, the system in question functioned
properly for many years, but did not receive any system maintenance. After being pumped and
having preventative maintenance work performed, the system resumed proper functioning and has
done so without further difficulty for over three years.
51.

Relying on the county's approval of the subdivision, over 52 lots have been purchased by
11

the plaintiffs.
52.

Further, the Wasatch County Code and the subdivision's preliminary approvals required

the original developer to supply, at his own expense, the subdivision's mutual water company with
1600 gallons of water per day, per residence, for irrigation and culinary uses (1 8 acre feet per
year, per residence). However, Wasatch County did not enforce this requirement and significantly
less water was provided by the developer. Current county regulations continue to require 1600
gallons of water per day, per residence, and the subdivision cannot comply with these regulations
without the individual property owners incurring great personal expense.
53.

Over a period of time the plaintiffs became concerned over the activities of NCM due to

its proposal to double the size of the subdivision from just over 80 lots to 160 These
apprehensions were heightened by concerns over the developer's questionable sales practices and
misrepresentations relating to water and percolation testing in the area and the county's apathy
concerning these practices.
54.

As part of the process to expand development in the area, NCM submitted a three volume

environmental impact study to Wasatch County. In March of 1996 the plaintiffs presented a
response to this three volume study and the proposed expansion of the subdivision in Canyon
Meadows to the planning commission. In this response the home owners articulated their
concerns over doubling the size of a development. Due to the county's apparent lack of interest
or desire to enforce its code on NCM, the homeowners felt compelled to point out the possible
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consequences of allowing twice as many homes in the area and introducing twice as much water
in the environment.
55.

The home owners also took their concerns regard NCM to the county attorney where they

were informed that the county would not take any action to investigate NCM's questionable
practices.
56.

The homeowners then went to the Wasatch County commission with their concerns. The

county commission directed Robert Mathis to meet with the representatives of the property
owners to address their concerns. During several meetings with Mr. Mathis, the property owners
expressed their disappointment with Mr. Mathis and the planning department for their failure to
enforce the county development regulations on NCM.
57.

In December of 1996, Robert Mathis, drafted an ordinance that placed a moratorium on

the issuance of building permits in an expansive area including Canyon Meadows and the
surrounding areas extending down to the Provo River.
58.

While the ordinance was being drafted, Mr. Mathis never mentioned any serious concerns

over slope stability, septic failures, or the drafting of Ordinance 97-1 to home owners'
representatives.
59.

Ordinance 97-1 was presented directly to the Wasatch County Commission and was not

presented to the Wasatch County Planning Commission, nor did the planning commission make
any recommendation on the ordinance before it was presented and adopted by the county
commission.
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60.

This emergency temporary ordinance was drafted nearly two and half years after the

UDOT report, over a year after the AGRA report and the corresponding UGS comments, and
over 10 months after the homeowners expressed their concerns over doubling the proposed
development. It was not until shortly after Mr. Mathis began his meetings with the property
owners in which he and his department were criticized on their favored treatment of developers
that he began formulating Ordinance 97-1.
61.

Several prospective buyers, plaintiffs to this action, contacted defendants Mathis and

Wright just months before the adoption of Ordinance 97-1 to inquire about the suitability of septic
systems and the ability to secure a building permit in Canyon Meadows. These property owners
were informed that they could obtain building permits and that they would have no problems with
getting a septic system on their property. However, within only a matter of a few weeks after
buying property in Canyon Meadow based on these representations, the property owners were
informed they could not get a septic system approved and that they could not build.
62.

Ordinance 97-1 was signed by the county commission on January 13, 1997.

63.

In spite of the county's previous position that septic systems were feasible, which the

county had maintained for nearly twenty years, Ordinance 97-1 effectively prohibited the use of
"septic tanks and drain fields for sewage disposal in the Canyon Meadows area of Wasatch
County." The ordinance stated that the County had "serious concerns" about the slide danger
posed in the Canyon Meadows Subdivision after previous concerns were repeatedly deemed
unwarranted and multiple plats were approved.
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64.

The terms of the ordinance called for a comprehensive study of the geology and a report

on the continued use of individual septic systems in Canyon Meadows. Further, by its express
terms, Ordinance 97-1 would expire six months after its effective date, which would have been
June 22, 1997, as Ordinance 97-1 was published on January 22,1997.
65.

Despite the terms of Ordinance 97-1, which called for a comprehensive study, Wasatch

County only authorized AGEC, the engineering firm the county retained, to do a literature review
of previous geological studies performed in the area.
66.

In commissioning this test, Robert Mathis indicated that the county desired results that

supported the county's new position that the subdivision was on a dangerous, active slide. Also,
the county authorized only a very limited budget and would not pay to have a "comprehensive
study" completed. While other engineering firms turned the work away, stating that there was
insufficient money to conduct a complete and comprehensive investigation, AGEC accepted the
offer. However, AGEC also indicated that it would not do a complete or "comprehensive study"
with new testing due to insufficient funding. As a result, in order to avoid potential liability,
AGEC made the most conservative conclusions it could by supporting the county's previously
unsupported position and claiming that the area was a dangerous slide area. AGEC believed that
this conservative opinion would most effectively limit its liability since it did not do any testing.
Without any further testing, AGEC simply concluded that it is possible there might be movement
in Canyon Meadows and that further studies may be needed.
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67.

Based on little or no data, and again without proper notice or presenting the ordinance to

the planning commission, Wasatch County claimed to enact Ordinance 97-6 on July 21,1997.
This ordinance was expressly intended to continue the moratorium imposed by Ordinance 97-1,
extending and expanding Ordinance 97-1 beyond the six month limitation. Ordinance 97-6 was
never signed or published
68.

On August 11, 1997, Wasatch County amended Ordinance 97-6 ever so slightly and

renumbered it to become Ordinance 97-132. The specific purpose of extending the moratorium
on Canyon Meadows was again expressed in the amended version.
69.

According to Ordinance 97-13 the ordinance becomes effective "upon signing and one

publication in a newspaper having local circulation." Ordinance 97-13 was apparently not signed
until October 1997 and it was not published until November 1997.
70.

Even though there were lapses of time between the moratorium ordinances,, Wasatch

County continued a defacto moratorium on Canyon Meadows.
71.

The express terms of both 97-6 and 97-13 stated that the "temporary regulations adopted

by this ordinance shall remain in effect until the Commission can hear and decide permanent
changes in zoning regulations for septic tanks and slope stability."

2

The amendment only replaced the phrase " prior to the completion of the complete slope stability study"
with the phrase "prior to the completion of a slope stability study establishing that the property is sufficiently stable
for a residential building under accepted safety and building principles" at the ends of paragraphs 3 and 4.
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72.

Neither Ordinance 97-13 nor the 97-6 version of the moratorium were presented to the

planning commission before being adopted by the county commission, although the issue did go t
the board of health.
73.

While Ordinance 97-1 covered the Canyon Meadows Subdivision and the surrounding

areas down to the Provo River, Ordinance 97-13 reduced the area regulated by the restrictions in
such a manner that the only areas practically covered by the moratorium were the lots in plats A
and B of the subdivision. After Ordinance 97-13, the areas encircling Canyon Meadows were no
longer included in the moratorium. Even areas directly below the subdivision and closer to the
river were dropped from the moratorium by Ordinance 97-13. For all practical purposes
Ordinance 97-13 was tailored to affect only the plaintiffs.
74.

Subsequent to Ordinance 97-13, the Canyon Meadows Home Owners Association was

required to retain its own geotechnical engineers to perform slope stability testing in order to
satisfy the requirements of Ordinance 97-13. The association was forced to pay over $50,000 for
this testing despite aerial photos showing no movement in the subdivision for nearly half a century
and despite the fact that homes, roads, and water lines have existed on the subdivision for nearly
two decades without any sign of cracking or movement.
75.

Further, in September of 1997, the county attempted to enact an ordinance that would

have eliminated or severely limited the services the county would provide to development such as
Canyon Meadows, including fire and police protection, school buses, mail delivery, and medical
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or ambulance services. However, due to a strong public reaction against the ordinance, the
county was not successful in adopting the ordinance.
76.

Again, in October of 1997, Bob Mathis and Phil Wright sought to impose another

ordinance aimed directly at Canyon Meadows which would have required the installation of a
sewage treatment plant to service the area, which would have been paid for by the Canyon
Meadows property owners. This requirement would have imposed enormous financial obligations
on the homeowners for a sewage system which the state has indicated would not even be
functional or viable in Canyon Meadows.
77.

When the planning commission refused to give their approval to the proposed ordinance

Bob Mathis became visibly upset and openly criticized the commission for its decision. The
purposed ordinance was not presented to the county commission.
78.

In August of 1998 slope stability testing indicated that there was no movement on the

slope that would pose any serious threat to structures in the subdivision. However, the county
required an additional seismic deformation analysis be preformed to determine the impact an
earthquake would have on the area before it would consider lifting the moratorium. None of the
moratorium ordinances required any seismic deformation studies.
79.

In November of 1998, nearly two years after the adoption of Ordinance 97-1 and after the

expenditure of huge sums of money by the property owners, the Wasatch County Commission
met to review the slope stability issues for a single lot in Canyon Meadows.
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80.

At this meeting a county attorney clearly stated that the county did not believe there was

any slope movement in Canyon Meadows when it adopted Ordinance 97-1 or Ordinance 97-13.
81.

It was decided that slope stability issues did not pose a serious risk in Canyon Meadows

and that a building permit for the lot should not be denied based on slope stability concerns.
However, when asked if the decision on the one lot applied to the other platted lots, the county
attorney indicated the determination was limited to the single lot under review.
82.

The commission did not address septic issues at all in November of 1998. To date the

county commission has not made any decisions on the septic issues raised in Ordinance 97-1 and
Ordinance 97-13.
83.

However, even if the issues of slope stability were resolved, Phil Wright and the Wasatch

County-City Health Department have continued to impose progressively more stringent
requirements on the issuance of permits for individual septic systems than those which were
required for permits previously issued in Canyon Meadows. Phil Wright continues to impose
new and additional interpretations of county regulations as a method for denying septic permits or
significantly reducing the size of homes that would be allowed on a lot.
84.

Subsequent to Ordinance 97-1, the county directed AGEC to determine ground water

table levels in Canyon Meadows. Approximately 40 monitoring wells were installed on the
plaintiffs' private property in platted areas of the subdivision. Neither AGEC, the Wasatch
County-City Health Department, nor Wasatch County sought or received permission to install the
monitoring wells from the plaintiff owners of the private property.
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85.

Defendants have repeatedly entered the plaintiffs' property without permission and have

caused equipment and vehicles to enter upon plaintiffs' property without permission to check the
monitoring wells and presently continue to do so.
86.

While geological and hydrological conditions which are similar to those in Canyon

Meadow exist in other areas of Wasatch County, no other development has been required to meet
the stringent slope and septic requirements imposed on Canyon Meadows.
87.

These special and restrictive conditions imposed on Canyon Meadows have discouraged

or prevented the sale of numerous lots in the Canyon Meadows subdivision.
88.

Wasatch County, the health department, the current county commission, and private

developers have also sought to impose a special service district for sewer and water on Canyon
Meadows. They have organized the Owl's Nest Special Service District which is purportedly
intended to service areas outside of Canyon Meadows, but the district is comprised of segments
that encircle the subdivision and which can only be connected by crossing Canyon Meadows
lands.
89.

The new district is purportedly intended to serve 12 large lots, but the vast majority of

these lots have the ability to sustain individual septic systems and would not require a community
system.
90.

The new district has been created without any information on the details of how the

community system would work, without any information how the district would be financed,
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operated, or controlled, and without any showing of a public necessity, all for the benefit of a
single private developer.
91.

Special service districts in Wasatch County are controlled by the county commission. The

county commission, past and present, has failed to demonstrate any ability or desire to properly
govern these districts, but has created the districts to benefit selected developers and has allowed
them to be operated in a manner that has been fraught with inappropriate activities. The
commission has ignored attempted bribery, gifts and gratuities to public officials, and highly
questionable distributions of district funds.
92.

The creation of the Owl's Nest Special Service District by the current county commission

is a continuation of this practice and will work to impose undue burden and hardship on the
residents of Canyon Meadows and any future lot owner in the Canyon Meadows area.
93.

In direct response to the home owners' efforts to obtain public information from the

county on special service districts, septic issues and other information, the Wasatch County
enacted Resolution 99-11, which amended Section XVIII of the Wasatch County Personnel
Policy. By its terms the amendment states that elected officials, department heads, and certain
employees shall not "communicate with plaintiffs regarding matters related to the pending
litigation." Instead when county personnel are contacted by anyone involved in litigation with the
county, they are directed to immediately terminate the communication and refer the plaintiff to the
County Attorney's Office which, in its discretion, may or may not respond to communications
related to pending litigation.
21

94.

The amendment treats individuals who have sought redress from the county differently

than any other citizen. In its application, Resolution 99-11 has been used to deny Canyon
Meadows access to public information which is available to any other citizen.
95.

These ordinances and the irresponsible, reckless, and bad faith actions by the County and

its agents have rendered the lots and all improvements thereon worthless and constitute a
violation of the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected civil rights.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
WASATCH COUNTY ORDINANCE 97-1
AND WASATCH COUNTY ORDINANCE 97-13
ARE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND ILLEGAL
96.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 96 as if fully set forth

herein.
97.

According to § 17-5-263 of U.C.A. the Board of County Commissioners "may pass all

ordinances and rules and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into
effect or discharging the powers and duties conferred by this title, and as are necessary and proper
to provide for the safety, and preserve the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, and good order, comfort, and conveniences of the county and its inhabitants, and for the
protection of property in the county."
98.

Ordinance 97-1 and Ordinance 97-13 are not "necessary" for any of the limited

enumerated purposes of the ordinance power as set forth in § 17-5-263.
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99.

Furthermore, rather than seeking to protect property and promote good order and peace

in the county, Ordinance 97-1 and Ordinance 97-13 take property and its associated rights from
the plaintiffs without compensation and strip the citizens of their constitutional rights and are
therefore repugnant to law.
100.

Ordinance 97-1 and Ordinance 97-13 were not properly presented to the county planning

commission and the planning commission made no recommendation on these ordinances and were
therefore passed in direct contradiction of state law. The ordinances also imposed fees, which is a
violation of state statutes.
101.

No countervailing public interest existed to justify the use of the temporary zoning

provisions of the Utah Code nor to deprive the property owners of the rights and protections the
Utah State Legislature has established in the standard zoning process.
102.

The adoption and application of these ordinances are arbitrary and capricious.

103.

Accordingly, in the interests of justice and equity the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory

judgment that these unlawful ordinances are null and void ab initio and should be awarded their
attorney fees in bringing this action.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ORDINANCES 97-1 AND 97-13 AND
RESOLUTION 99-11 ARE VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C 1983
104.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 104 as if fully set forth

herein.
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105.

According to 42 U.S.C. 1983 "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."
106.

Wasatch County Ordinance 97-1, Wasatch County Ordinance 97-13, and Wasatch County

Resolution 99-11 violate the plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process rights under both
the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and the Plaintiffs equal
protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
107.

Wasatch County's violation of these rights has caused the plaintiffs to suffer significant

damages equal to the purchase price of their lots and the cost of all improvements thereon, plus
damages to be proven at trial including lost appreciation of value.
108.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, defendant Wasatch County is liable to the plaintiffs for the

damages caused.
109.

Defendant Robert Mathis has, with bad faith and with malice, used his position as Wasatch

County Planner to impose unjustified restrictions on plaintiffs to the depravation of their rights,
privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United states.
110.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, defendant Robert Mathis is liable to the plaintiffs for the

damages caused.
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111.

Defendant Phil Wright has, under the color of statute or rule, imposed unauthorized

requirements and regulations upon the plaintiffs, knowingly and intentionally violating plaintiffs'
due process and equal protection rights. In the alternative Phil Wright, the Wasatch County
Health Director for nearly 20 years, was willfully ignorant or plainly incompetent as to the lawful
and binding regulations in Wasatch County and simply substituted his own rules and regulations in
plain disregard for the plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process rights.
112.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, defendant Phil Wright is liable to the plaintiffs for the

damages caused.
113.

Defendants Laren Provost, Ralph Duke, Michael Kohler, Keith Jacobson, and Sharron

Winterton, while exercising the executive functions of county commissioners, did, with bad faith
and malice, use the color of their office to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights, privileges, and
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Executive actions of
defendant commissioners in enforcing and applies rules and laws upon the plaintiffs were based on
malice and personal animosity toward plaintiffs.
114.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, defendant commissioners are liable to the plaintiffs for the

damages caused.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
THE MORATORIUM ORDINANCE CONSTITUTES AN INVERSE CONDEMNATION
115.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 115 as if fully set forth

herein.

25

116.

Wasatch County Ordinance 97-1 and Wasatch Ordinance 97-13 deprive plaintiffs all

economically viable use of their property, and therefore effected a "taking" under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments that required the payment of just compensation.
117.

No legitimate threat to public safety or potential public nuisance existed to justify the

imposition of Wasatch County Ordinance 97-1 and Wasatch Ordinance 97-13 or the
accompanying defacto moratorium.
118.

Further, § 17-27-404 prohibits the imposition of fees and financial obligations on the

property owners as a result of a temporary ordinance. However, the county required the Canyon
Meadows Home Owners Association to expend over $50,000 in geotechnical studies before it
would consider lifting the moratorium.
119.

The County has not paid or offered to pay any compensation for the losses plaintiffs have

suffered as a result of Wasatch County Ordinance 97-1 and Wasatch Ordinance 97-13 and the
accompanying defacto moratorium.
120.

As such, the Ordinances constitute an unlawful taking (inverse condemnation) that has

damaged the plaintiffs in an amount equal to the purchase price of their lots, the cost of all
improvements thereon, and the costs and fees related to the geological studies required by
Wasatch County. Plaintiffs are also entitled to other damages to be proven at trial including lost
appreciation of value.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
WASATCH COUNTY ORDINANCE 97-1,
WASATCH ORDINANCE 97-13 ORDINANCE, AND
THE DEFACTO MORATORIUM ARE
BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF ZONING ESTOPPEL
121.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 121 as if fully set forth

herein.
122.

Defendant Wasatch County repeatedly reviewed septic feasibility and slope stability in the

various phases of the Canyon Meadows and repeatedly found these septic systems to be feasible
with satisfactory slope stability.
123.

Plaintiffs purchased their lots in Canyon Meadows with the single purpose of being able to

construct a home on the lot.
124.

Plaintiffs relied on the prior zoning regulations, prior plat approvals, prior policies,

CC&Rs and agreements with developers which allowed individual septic systems and which
allowed homes to be constructed on the area prior to purchasing their lots.
125.

Further, shortly before the moraioria, defendants Mathis and Wright made repeated

representation to individual plaintiffs that their property was suitable for building, including the
use of septic systems, and that they would have no problems.
126.

Plaintiffs' reliance on the county's official policy and prior approvals was reasonable.

127.

All studies relied upon by defendants addressed the expansion of the subdivision to nearly

double its current size, however, the results of these studies were applied to the previously
approved areas of the subdivision without justification.
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128.

Ordinance 97-1 and Ordinance 97-13 have subsequently eliminated plaintiffs' ability to

build on their property or sell the property and destroyed all economically viable use of the lots
and all improvements thereon.
129.

As a result of plaintiffs reliance, plaintiffs' are entitled to such equitable relief as is just and

proper, including a declaratory judgment that Wasatch County is estopped from enforcing
Ordinance 97-13, a defacto moratorium, or any like ordinance against the plaintiffs, and an award
of attorney fees for bringing this action.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
THE ORDINANCES VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS' 5th AND 14th AMENDMENT
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS
130.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 130 as if fully set forth

herein.
131.

Prior to the passing of Ordinance 97-1 and Ordinance 97-13, the plaintiffs were not given

adequate notice sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
132.

Furthermore, plaintiflFs, substantive and procedural due process and equal protection rights

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated by
the passing of Ordinance 97-1 and Ordinance 97-13.
133.

As a result of the county's violations of the plaintiffs1 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights, plaintiffs have been harmed and are entitled to such equitable relief as is just and proper,
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including a declaratory judgment that the adoption of Wasatch County Ordinances 97-1 and
97-13 are unconstitutional, and an award of attorney fees for bring this action.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 17-27-404:
ORDINANCES EXCEED SIX MONTHS
134.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 138 as if fully set forth

herein.
135.

By the terms of Ordinance 97-1, the ordinance was to expire within six months but the

moratorium continued defacto and Ordinance 97-13 became effective eleven months latter.
136.

By its specific terms Ordinance 97-13 was to remain in effect for more than six months.

137.

The moratorium first imposed by Ordinance 97-1 has been extended, by express and

defacto moratoria, for well over two years. The effects of the Ordinance 97-1 and Ordinance 9713 still impact the property, appearing on title reports, clouding title, and limiting the owner's
ability to build on, sale, or otherwise use the property .
138.

According to § 17-27-404 of the Utah Code Annotated, the effect of temporary zoning

ordinances may not exceed six months.
139.

Because the ordinances have remained in effect for more than six months, Ordinance 97-1,

Ordinance 97-13, and the defacto moratorium are in violation of §17-27-404, et seq.
140.

As a result of these violations, plaintiffs have been harmed and are entitled to equitable

relief that is just and proper, including a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 97-13 and the
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accompanying defacto moratorium were illegal extensions of the six month limitation on
temporary ordinances and other such relief deemed appropriate.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 17-27-404
NO COMPELLING, COUNTERVAILING PUBLIC INTEREST
141.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 145 as if fully set forth

herein.
142.

According to § 17-27-404, in order to pass a temporary zoning regulation there must be a

compelling, countervailing public interest.
143.

There is not a compelling, countervailing public interest for passing Ordinance 97-1 or

Ordinance 97-13 that satisfies § 17-27-404.
144.

As a result of these violations, plaintiffs have been harmed and are entitled to equitable

relief that is just and proper, including a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 97-1 and Ordinance
97-13 were arbitrary, capricious, and illegal for lack of countervailing public interest and such
other equitable relief as is deemed appropriate.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
IMPROPER EXECUTION OF ORDINANCE
145.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 149 as if fiilly set forth

herein.
146.

At the August 11, 1997, public hearing addressing the subject matter of Ordinance 97-13,

the County Attorney, Dan Matthews, and the Deputy County Attorney, Joseph Dunbeck,
proclaimed on the record that the effective date of the ordinance would be August 11, 1997.
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147.

However, this effective date is in violation of the specific terms of Ordinance 97-13.

According to Ordinance 97-13 the ordinance becomes effective "upon signing and one publication
in a newspaper having local circulation."
148.

The Ordinance 97-13 was purportedly signed in October of 1997, and was not published

until November of 1997.
149.

Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief that is just and proper, including a declaratory

judgment that Ordinance 97-13 did not become eflfective until November 12, 1997, and such other
equitable relief as is deemed appropriate.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
ENFORCEMENT OF UNAPPROVED ORDINANCE
150.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 154 as if fully set forth

herein.
151.

At the August 11, 1997, public hearing that was purportedly the eflfective date of

Ordinance 97-13, the County Attorney, Dan Matthews, and the Deputy County Attorney, Joseph
Dunbeck, proclaimed on the record that the eflfective date of ordinance 97-13 would be August
11, 1997.
152.

However, this effective date is in violation of the terms of Ordinance 97-13. According to

Ordinance 97-13 the ordinance becomes effective "upon signing and one publication in a
newspaper having local circulation, which publication came in November of 1997.
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153.

However, even though the ordinance was not effective, the County enforced the ordinance

and deprived plaintiffs of building permits claiming Ordinance 97-1 and Ordinance 97-13 as
support.
154.

As a result of these violations, plaintiffs are harmed and are entitled to equitable relief that

is just and proper, including a declaratory judgment that there was no valid or lawful moratorium
without the publication in a newspaper and the enforcement of Ordinance 97-13 prior to such
publication was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, and such other equitable relief as is deemed
appropriate.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS FOR ORDINANCE
155.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 159 as if fully set forth

herein.
156.

Pursuant to Ordinance 97-1 the county obligated itself to commission a "comprehensive

study" to determine the geology of the subdivision area.
157.

Instead of a "comprehensive study," the county had AGEC review old data and prepare

another report on the old data that had been in existence for several years.
158.

AGEC's incomplete report formed the basis of Ordinance 97-13.

159.

As a result, the county did not have a sufficient factual basis and did not make sufficient

findings to justify and support Ordinance 97-13.
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160.

Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief that is just and proper, including a declaratory

judgment that Ordinance 97-13 was without sufficient findings and is therefore arbitrary,
capricious, and illegal, and such other equitable relief as is deemed appropriate.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
TRESPASS
161.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 165 as if fully set forth

herein.
162.

Subsequent to Ordinance 97-1, the county directed AGEC to determine ground water

table levels in Canyon Meadows. Approximately 40 monitoring wells were placed on private
property in platted areas of the subdivision. Neither AGEC, the Wasatch County-City Health
Department, or Wasatch County sought or received permission to install the monitoring wells on
that private property.
163.

Over the course of nearly two years, the defendants did repeatedly enter the plaintiffs'

property without permission and did cause equipment and vehicles to enter upon plaintiffs'
property without permission to check the monitoring wells.
164.

The health department has continually used the information obtained by trespassing on the

plaintiffs' property to deny septic permits, or to limit the size of homes the health department will
allow on a lot.
165.

The plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief that is just and proper, including a declaratory

judgment that the agents of the county illegally entered the plaintiffs' property, an injunction
restraining the county's agents from committing further trespasses, and a permanent injunction
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against Wasatch County and the Wasatch City-County Health department prohibiting them from
relying on or utilizing information obtained through the illegal trespass in imposing restriction and
conditions on the plaintiffs' properties.
TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
166.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 170 as if fully set forth

herein.
167.

Defendants have intentionally imposed such conditions and restrictions on the plaintiffs'

property as to prevent or severely limit the use thereof. These limitations exceeded the scope of
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-404 which only allows a temporary zoning regulation to "prohibit,
restrict, or regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, or alteration of any building or
structure or subdivision approval," but does not allow the restrictions on sales.
168.

These illegal actions have harmed the plaintiffs by discouraging or prohibiting the sale of

plaintiffs' property, by clouding title to the plaintiffs' property, by making it so difficult to secure
a septic permit or by restricting the size of home that can be built upon the plaintiffs' property that
buyers will not purchase the property or will only purchase for reduced amounts.
169.

The defendants intentionally, wrongfully, and illegally interfered in the plaintiffs' economic

relations.
170.

Based on the county's interference with the economic relations, the plaintiffs have suffered

significant damages to be proven at trial.
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THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
RESOLUTION 99-11 IS INVALID
AS IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATES STATE LAW.
171.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 175 as if fully set forth

herein.
172.

Resolution 99-11 violates Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. seq. (Government Records

Access and Management Act) in that it restricts access to public information that is not private,
controlled, or protected.
173.

Resolution 99-11 unconstitutionally creates a separate and distinct class of individuals and

discriminates against the class in refusing them rights granted to the general population, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
174.

According to 42 US.C. 1983, "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."
175.

The plaintiffs are members of the class Resolution 99-11 discriminates against and are

being denied their civil rights to equal protection under the law.
176.

The adoption and application of Resolution 99-11 is arbitrary and capricious.
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177.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, defendant Wasatch County is liable to the plaintiffs for the

damages caused, including attorney fees for bringing this action. Further plaintiffs are entitled to
a declaratory judgment that Wasatch County Resolution 99-11 is unconstitutional and void as
contradicting state law.
FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
178.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 182 as if fully set forth

herein.
179.

Defendants' Mathis, Wright, Kohler, Duke, Provost, Jacobson, and Winterton actions

were wilful, malicious, and manifest a knowing and reckless indifference towards the plaintiffs'
rights.
180.

As public officials and officers, the defendants' Mathis, Wright, Kohler, Duke, Provost,

Jacobson, and Winterton were entrusted to act in the public interest and to protect the rights of
citizens in Wasatch County. In their wilful and malicious conduct the defendants have breached
that trust.
181.

These action and omissions are of such a character as to offend the commonly accepted

standards of honesty and moral behavior and constitute a breach of the trust imposed upon these
defendants by nature of their offices.
182.

Plaintiffs' have in fact been injured by the defendants' actions.

183.

Based upon their conduct defendants' Mathis, Wright, Kohler, Duke, Provost, Jacobson,

and Winterton should be liable to the plaintiffs for punitive damages to be proven at trial.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows:
1.

For judgment on damages for the second, third, thirteenth, and fourteenth causes of action

in an amount of $10,000,000;
2.

For judgment on punitive damages based on the defendant's willful and malicious conduct

and actions towards the plaintiffs;
3.

For a declaratory judgment that Wasatch County Ordinance 97-1 and 97-13 are arbitrary,

capricious, unlawful, and null and void ab initio;
4.

For a declaratory judgment that Wasatch County is estopped from enforcing Ordinance

97-13, a defacto moratorium, or any like ordinance against the plaintiffs;
5.

For a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 97-13 and the accompanying defacto

moratorium were illegal extensions of the six month limitation on temporary ordinances;
6.

For a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 97-13, if valid at all, did not become effective

until November 12, 1997;
7.

For a declaratory judgment that there was no valid or lawful moratorium without the

publication in a newspaper and therefore the enforcement of Ordinance 97-13 prior to such
publication was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal;
8.

For a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 97-13 was without sufficient findings and it

was therefore arbitrary, capricious, and illegal;
9.

For a declaratory judgment that the agents of the county illegally entered the plaintiffs

property;
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10.

For a restraining order prohibiting the county's agents from committing further trespasses;

11.

For a permanent injunction against Wasatch County and the Wasatch City County Health

department prohibiting them from relying on or utilizing information obtained through the illegal
trespass in imposing restrictions and conditions on the plaintiffs' properties;
12.

For a declaratory judgment that Wasatch County Resolution 99-11 is unconstitutional and

void under state law;
13.

For a declaratory judgment that Wasatch County regulations required the developer to

transfer sufficient water rights to the Canyon Meadows Mutual Water to provide 1600 gallons of
water per day, per residence, and that current county regulations and ordinances continue to
require subdividers to provide at least 1600 gallons of water per day per dwelling unit where
water is to be used for outside uses;
14.

For a declaratory judgment that Wasatch County is to provide sufficient water rights to

the Canyon Meadows Mutal Water Company so as to provide the required quantities the original
developer failed to supply;
15.

For attorney fees and costs as a result of Plaintiffs being required to bring this action; and

16.

For any other legal and equitable relief the court deems appropriate.
DATED December j{_,

1999.
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P C .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify than on December^ 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of AMENDED
COMPLAINT to be served upon the following by
D

mailing it by first class mail to:

D

causing it to be hand-delivered it to:

Craig Wentz
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
50 South Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84144
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$

Craig V.Wentz, #3681
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)355-3431
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CANYON MEADOWS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION; VICTOR ORVIS;
BRADLEY CLEMENTS; ROBERT and
KAREN SWENSON,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 990500239

vs.
PHIL WRIGHT and THE WASATCH
COUNTY-CITY HEALTH DEPARTMENT
and BOARD OF HEALTH,

Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendants.

Based upon the stipulation and motion of the parties, and good cause appearing therefor;

Approved as to form:
DUVAL, HANSEN, WTTT & MORELY

jordon N. Duval
Brian Haws
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 17. COUNTIES
CHAPTER 27. COUNTY LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT ACT
PART 4. ZONING ORDINANCE
Copyright ®

1953-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed

Elsevier Properties Inc.
17-27-404

All rights reserved.

Temporary regulations.

(1) (a) A county legislative body may, without a public hearing, enact an
ordinance establishing a temporary zoning regulation for any part or all of the
area within the county if:
(i) the legislative body makes a finding of compelling, countervailing public
interest; or
(ii) the area is unzoned.
(b) A temporary zoning regulation under Subsection (1)(a) may prohibit,
restrict, or regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, or alteration of
any building or structure or subdivision approval.
(c) A temporary zoning regulation under Subsection (1)(a) may not impose an
impact fee or other financial requirement on building or development.
(2) The county legislative body shall establish a period of 1 imited effect for
the temporary ordinance not to exceed six months.
(3) (a) A county legislative body may, without a public hearing, enact an
ordinance establishing a temporary zoning regulation prohibiting construction,
subdivision approval, and other development activities within an area that is the
subject of an Environmental Impact Statement or a Major Investment Study examining
the area as a proposed highway or transportation corridor.
(b) A zoning regulation under Subsection

(3)(a):

(i) may not exceed six months in duration;
(ii) may be renewed, if requested by the Utah Transportation Commission
created under Section 63-49-10, for up to two additional six-month periods by
ordinance enacted before the expiration of the previous zoning regulation; and
(iii) notwithstanding Subsections (3)(b)(i) and (ii), is effective only as
long as the Environmental Impact Statement or Major Investment Study is in
progress.
History: C. 1953, 17-27-404, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 235, §
34; 1997, ch. 171, § 2.

74; 1992, ch. 23, §
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UT ST § 17-27-404
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Amendment Notes. -- The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, deleted "Pending
the completion of or amendments to its zoning ordinance" from the introductory
language, added Subsections (1)(a)(i) and (1)(a)(ii), deleted Subsection (3) which
related to claims for damages, and made related changes.
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, inserted "county" before "legislative
body" and made stylistic changes in Subsections (1) and (2) and added Subsections
(1) (c) and (3) .
Effective Dates. -- Laws 1991, ch. 235, §
1992.

110 makes the act effective on July 1,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. -- Validity and effect of "interim" zoning ordinance, 30 A.L.R.3d 1196.
U.C.A. 1953 §
UT ST §

17-27-404

17-27-404
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